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Introduction
i Begin by frankly admitting this article is not meant to be a “balanced” treatment of D. T. Suzuki’s attitude toward Japanese imperialism, milita-
rism or warfare in general. Fortunately, a spirited defense of Suzuki’s alleged 
anti-war stance recently appeared in The Eastern Buddhist (vol. 39, no. 1, 
2008) in an article written by Kemmyō Taira Satō entitled: “D. T. Suzuki 
and the Question of War.” Thus, with Satō’s article highlighting what might 
be termed the “positive side” of Suzuki’s relationship to the WWII (Asia-
Pacific War, 1937–1945) era and before, I do not feel it unfair to focus 
almost solely on the “negative side” of that relationship given the limited 
space available. In doing this, I express the hope that interested readers 
will consider the points put forth in both articles (including Satō’s further 
response to this article) before reaching their own conclusions.
Next, let me express my sincere appreciation to the current editors of The 
Eastern Buddhist, a journal first edited by D. T. Suzuki, for providing this 
opportunity to share my latest research. I do not say this lightly, for not too 
long ago I was dropped from the 2006 documentary film A Zen Life—D. T. 
Suzuki. That is to say, the film’s director and producer, Michael Goldberg, 
to his credit, wanted to present a multifaceted version of Suzuki’s life and 
invited me to share my critique of Suzuki’s wartime record. I spent much 
of one day discussing my research in ever shorter sound bites in order that, 
as Goldberg put it, “your criticisms don’t end up on the cutting floor during 
the editing process.” Nevertheless, Goldberg later informed me that he was 
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dropping my interview because of his concern that my critical comments 
“would alienate other interviewees who were close to Suzuki.” Given this, 
the editorial board of The Eastern Buddhist is to be commended for their 
dedication to the presentation of conflicting viewpoints, even those critical 
of one of their founders.
Finally, let me express my appreciation to Satō for both his kind words 
about the importance of my overall research as well as challenging me, 
through his criticisms, to continue my investigation of Suzuki’s wartime 
record and beyond. Inasmuch as I am not a Suzuki specialist I readily admit 
that, thanks to Satō, I have learned things about Suzuki’s wartime record 
that I had not previously known. For this I am genuinely grateful. 
Suzuki’s Early Writings
One area in which Satō and I find ourselves in agreement is the need for 
a close examination of Shin shūkyō ron 新宗教論 (A New Theory of Reli-
gion), the first book D. T. Suzuki published in November 1896 at the age 
of twenty-six.1 The November date is significant in that only one month 
later Suzuki claimed to have had his initial enlightenment experience, i.e., 
kenshō 見性 (lit. seeing one’s original nature), the authenticity of which was 
acknowledged by his master, Shaku Sōen 釈宗演 (1859–1919), abbot of the 
major Rinzai Zen monastery of Engakuji 円覚寺.
Before examining this work, however, I would like to introduce the fol-
lowing seminal insight into the relationship of religion and the modern state 
written in 1932 by the German-American Protestant theologian, Reinhold 
Niebuhr:
The nation is always endowed with an aura of the sacred which is 
one reason why religions which claim universality, are so easily 
captured and tamed by national sentiment, religion and patrio-
tism merging in the process. . . . The best means of harmonizing 
the claim to universality with the unique and relative life of the 
nation, as revealed in moments of crisis, is to claim general and 
universally valid objectives for the nation. It is alleged to be fight-
ing for civilization and for culture, and the whole enterprise of 
humanity is supposedly involved in its struggle.2
Niebuhr goes on to describe those “men of culture” who promote this agenda 
as follows:
1 Suzuki Daisetsu zenshū (hereafter SDZ), vol. 23, pp. 1–147.
2 Quoted in Victoria 2003, p. 229.
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The religious or the rational nature to which they [men of cul-
ture] are devoted helps them to realize that moral values must 
be universal if they are to be real; and they cannot therefore give 
themselves to national aspirations, unless they clothe them in the 
attributes of universality. A few of them recognize the impossibil-
ity of such a procedure. Among most, the force of reason operates 
only to give the hysterias of war and the imbecilities of national 
politics more plausible excuses than an average man is capable of 
inventing. So they become the worst liars of wartime.3 
Next, let us test Niebuhr’s thesis in light of the content of the most con-
tentious chapter in Suzuki’s book: “The Relation of Religion and State.” 
Does Suzuki claim “general and universally valid objectives for the nation” 
that is at war? And did he allege that Japan was “fighting for civiliza-
tion and for culture, and the whole enterprise of humanity is supposedly 
involved in its struggle”? The answer to both questions is yes, as reflected 
in the following passages (using Satō’s own translation): (1) Thus, if an 
aggressive country comes and obstructs one’s commerce or violates one’s 
rights, this would truly interrupt the progress of all humanity; (2) as long as 
the state takes care not to lose this moral sense, one can anticipate the step-
by-step advancement of humanity and the fulfillment of universal ideals.4
True, Suzuki does condition the second statement above on the state not 
losing “this moral sense” which in this case refers to: “punish[ing] the peo-
ple of the country representing injustice in order that justice might prevail.”5 
And as Satō notes, Suzuki also placed the following conditions on the state: 
“if every action and movement of the state takes on a religious character 
and if every word and action of religion takes on a state character, then 
whatever is done for the sake of the state is done for religion, and whatever 
is done for the sake of religion is done for the state. The two are one, and 
one is the two.”
Yet in terms of historical reality, when and where has there ever been a 
state, past or present, in which “every action and movement of the state takes 
on a religious character”? Today, as in Suzuki’s time, it is typically the rich 
and powerful, most especially corporate leaders, who wield enormous influ-
ence over state policies, especially regarding questions of war and peace, 
inasmuch as wars are nearly always related to the acquisition of still more 
3 Victoria 2003, p. 229 (italics mine).
4 Quoted in Satō 2008, p. 68. 
5 Satō 2008, p. 68. 
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wealth and power for a nation’s ruling elites and corporate allies. Given this, 
how could anyone realistically believe that short of a radical reorganization 
of society and the state, the conditions Suzuki envisioned could ever exist? 
Either he was hopelessly naïve to assume this possibility or, as Niebuhr 
notes: “Among most [men of culture], the force of reason operates only to 
give the hysterias of war and the imbecilities of national politics more plau-
sible excuses than an average man is capable of inventing.”
No doubt Satō will fault me for asserting once again that Suzuki’s focus 
was on Japan in this chapter. In response I note that inasmuch as Suzuki 
chose to write in Japanese, his audience would naturally have been almost 
exclusively Japanese (especially since he never translated this work into 
English). Still more important, however, is the following quotation that 
Suzuki included in this chapter describing the attitude of soldiers facing the 
possibility of death on the battlefield: “[they] regard their own lives ‘as light 
as goose feathers and their duty as heavy as Mount Taishan.’ Should they 
fall on the battlefield they have no regrets. This is what is called ‘religion 
during the time of a [national] emergency.’ ”6
As his Japanese audience would have instantly recognized, the first quo-
tation is taken directly from Emperor Meiji’s 1882 “Imperial Rescript to 
Soldiers and Sailors.” Every Japanese military man had to accept this credo 
without question through to the end of WWII (Asia-Pacific War). Clearly, 
this particular phrase was not universal in nature, for the leaders of Western 
imperialist nations dared not order their troops to regard their lives as being 
“as light as goose feathers”!
This denigration of the worth of human life linked to unquestioning loy-
alty to the state unto death, would characterize the Japanese fighting man 
(and eventually Japanese society as a whole) up through 1945. Suzuki’s 
unique contribution was to provide a religious endorsement to this denigra-
tion through his nearly mystical, i.e., “non-dual,” identification of religion 
and the state—“the two are one, and one is the two.” While I cannot state 
with certainty that Suzuki was the first man of religion in modern Japan 
to articulate a theoretical framework for the unity of religion and the state, 
he was certainly a pioneer in this effort even though he would be far from 
being the last. 
Hopefully, there should be no need here to explain just how deeply “un-
Buddhist” if not “anti-Buddhist” Suzuki’s acceptance of the denigration of 
human life was even though he was clearly not its author. While as Satō 
asserts, by 1943 (if not before) Suzuki may have grown critical of the utter 
6 Quoted in Satō 2008, p. 68.
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waste of human life resulting from this denigration, e.g., militarily mean-
ingless “banzai charges,” etc., the fact remains that he had earlier adopted 
and promulgated this view to his fellow Japanese as his own. Even though 
Suzuki’s first book may have had relatively little influence on Japanese 
society as a whole, he still must answer, as a Buddhist layman, for his 
actions in light of the precepts of the Buddhist faith, first and foremost the 
precept against taking life.  
In any event, my critique of Suzuki, either as a young man or later, has 
little or no connection to how much influence he actually exerted on Japa-
nese society or its religious circles. I have never claimed that Suzuki was 
a major religious figure in the rise of Japanese militarism. What is of con-
cern is that this “man of Zen” (as he is popularly known) could have so 
closely identified religion, including the Buddha-dharma, with the state that 
when the latter initiated warfare it could be applauded for promoting “the 
advancement of humanity and the fulfillment of universal ideals.” 
Shaku Sōen, Suzuki’s Rinzai Zen Master
I note that Satō suggests that because Suzuki omitted references to the 
recently ended Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 from his first book, this 
omission may be considered an indication of his opposition to this war—a 
war that Satō admits was “aggressive in nature.”7 While I possess no defini-
tive information to the contrary, silence is more typically a sign of assent or 
at least acquiescence to an action rather than opposition. Further, it should 
be noted that in the aftermath of this particular war, Buddhism had come 
under criticism within Japanese society for having failed to aid the Japanese 
war effort in any practical manner. This failure was contrasted unfavorably 
with the Christian church in Japan that despite its small numbers actively 
engaged in such war relief activities as visiting wounded soldiers in hospi-
tals and extending aid to soldiers’ families.
Significantly, both of the Rinzai Zen abbots under whom Suzuki trained 
at Engakuji, initially Imakita Kōsen 今北洪川 (1816–1892) and then Shaku 
Sōen, were leaders of a pan-sectarian Buddhist reform movement known 
as shin bukkyō 新仏教 (New Buddhism) dedicated, among other things, to 
enhancing institutional Buddhism’s contribution to society in general as 
well as the needs of the state, both in peace and war. Given this, I suggest 
Suzuki’s Shin shūkyō ron can best be understood as one early attempt to 
provide the theoretical rationale for this reform movement. Since Bud-
7 Satō 2008, p. 73.
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dhism, unlike Japanese Christianity, had failed to serve the needs of the 
state during the Sino-Japanese War, it is hardly surprising that Suzuki did 
not refer to this war in his work, for it would only have served to under-
score institutional Buddhism’s inadequacies. However, during Japan’s next 
war, i.e., the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, all of this changed, and it 
was no less than Suzuki’s master, Shaku Sōen, who took the lead in exem-
plifying the wartime unity of religion and the state that Suzuki advocated. 
Specifically, Sōen volunteered to serve the Imperial Army as a Buddhist 
chaplain attached to the First Army Division. He explained his motivation 
as follows: “I wished to have my faith tested by going through the greatest 
horror of life, but I also wished to inspire, if I could, our valiant soldiers 
with the ennobling thoughts of the Buddha, so as to enable them to die on 
the battlefield with the confidence that the task in which they were engaged 
is great and noble.”8
And just what was this “great and noble” task that Japanese soldiers were 
involved in? Was Japan fighting a defensive war, repelling a Russian attack 
on its homeland? No, it was not, for it was once again fighting, this time 
with Tsarist Russia instead of China, for control of the Korean peninsula 
and, if possible, the Manchurian region of China. As the distinguished Japa-
nese historian Ienaga Saburō notes: “Government leaders . . . had started 
the quest for glory by fighting China for hegemony in Korea. Domination 
of Korea became a goal shared by successive administrations and the public 
at large.”9
The difference this time was that unlike militarily weak China, Russia 
was a relatively strong Western imperialist power at a time when Japan was 
still a minor one. Minor in the sense that Japan possessed only one over-
seas colony, i.e., the island of Taiwan. It had annexed Taiwan as a result of 
its victory in the Sino-Japanese War, something Satō conveniently fails to 
mention as, at least initially, he sought to portray Japan as solely the victim 
of Western imperialist designs. In any event, for Japan, Korea represented a 
much bigger prize. This clearly raises the question of whether Japan’s ongo-
ing imperialist expansion, this time at the expense of Korea’s independence, 
ranks as a great and noble task. 
And even more importantly from a Buddhist perspective, is there any 
reference in the many teachings attributed to Buddha Śākyamuni where he 
urges his followers to become soldiers, let alone think of his “ennobling 
thoughts,” so that they might die (and kill) on the battlefield with confidence?
8 Quoted in Victoria 1997, p. 26.
9 Quoted in Victoria 2006, p. 19.
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Still further, again like Suzuki, Sōen links the war, which Japan had 
started with a surprise attack, with universal moral values:
War is an evil and a great one indeed. But war against evils must 
be unflinchingly prosecuted till we attain the final aim. In the 
present hostilities, into which Japan has entered with great reluc-
tance, she pursues no egotistic purpose, but seeks the subjugation 
of evils hostile to civilization, peace, and enlightenment. . . . This 
being the case, war is not necessarily horrible, provided that it 
is fought for a just and honorable cause, that it is fought for the 
upholding of humanity and civilization.10
Is there not an uncanny resemblance between Sōen’s words and those of 
Suzuki? Perhaps this is not so surprising in that the two men were, after 
all, master and disciple. And as the English adage notes, “Like father, like 
son.” And should Satō object that similarities in wording not withstand-
ing, it is unfair to infer anything about Suzuki’s own thinking on the basis 
of his master’s thoughts, it bears repeating that it was Suzuki himself who 
translated his master’s words into English and arranged for their publication 
under the title: Sermons of a Buddhist Abbot. That is to say, it was Suzuki 
who, as translator, was responsible for including the word “sermon” in the 
title, clearly indicating that he believed the book contained an exposition of 
the Buddha-dharma.
As a result of Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War, Japan would 
not simply annex Korea in 1910, exploiting its natural resources and cheap 
labor as do all imperialist countries, but similar to the earlier U.S. treatment 
of Native Americans, it also attempted to commit cultural genocide against 
the Korean people by forcing them to adopt the personal and family names, 
language and religious faith of the colonizer, i.e., primarily Shinto but also 
“Japanese-style” Buddhism with its predominantly married clergy. Accord-
ing to Sōen, however, Japan had fought Russia for “no egotistic purpose” 
while seeking “the subjugation of evils hostile to civilization, peace, and 
enlightenment.” 
Returning to Suzuki, Satō failed to produce any public statement, or any 
statement at all, in which Suzuki criticizes Sōen for the bellicose statements 
he made as a military chaplain during the Russo-Japanese War or for hav-
ing twisted or misrepresented the meaning of his (Suzuki’s) earlier work let 
alone the words attributed to Buddha Śākyamuni. While by October 1904 
10 Victoria 2006, pp. 27–28 (italics mine).
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Suzuki may have bemoaned the war’s massive death toll, in what amounts 
to a serious and deeply misleading distortion of the historical record, Satō 
fails to inform his readers that when Japan first attacked Russian naval 
forces stationed in China on 10 February 1904, Suzuki, then resident in the 
U.S., commented: “The Chicago papers this morning published two naval 
battles fought at Port Arthur and Chemulpo, in both of which the Japanese 
seem to have won a complete victory. This is a brilliant start & [sic] I hope 
that they would keep on this campaign in a similar manner till the end.”11 
In the same year, Suzuki also wrote: “Let us then shuffle off this mortal coil 
whenever it becomes necessary, and not raise a grunting voice against the 
fates. . . . Resting in this conviction, Buddhists carry the banner of Dharma 
over the dead and dying until they gain final victory.”12 
In these comments we have a clear indication that Suzuki, even five years 
after his initial enlightenment experience, shared the triumphal nationalism, 
if not imperialism, of his contemporaries. Was an enlightenment experience 
of no help in allowing Suzuki (let alone Shaku Sōen et al.) to transcend the 
narrow and imperialistic nationalism of his day? Was Suzuki unaware of 
chapter 5, stanza 15 of the Dhammapada in which Buddha Śākyamuni is 
recorded as having said: “Victory breeds hatred. The defeated live in pain. 
Happily the peaceful live giving up victory and defeat”? Be that as it may, 
it was not until some months later, with “complete victory” in doubt, that 
Suzuki began to lament the war’s horrific toll in human life. 
Further, shortly after Japan’s eventual but extremely costly victory in 
1905, Suzuki wrote about what he saw as the unity of Zen and Bushido as 
embodied by Japan’s modern soldiers. In a 1906 English-language article in 
the Journal of the Pali Text Society entitled “The Zen Sect of Buddhism,” 
Suzuki also sought to defend the Zen-influenced soldier’s willingness to die 
in battle from Western criticism:
The Lebensanschauung of Bushido is no more nor less than that of 
Zen. The calmness and even joyfulness of heart at the moment of 
death which is conspicuously observable in the Japanese, the intre-
pidity which is generally shown by the Japanese soldiers in the face 
of an overwhelming enemy; and the fairness of play to an opponent 
so strongly taught by Bushido—all these come from a spirit of the 
Zen training, and not from any such blind, fatalistic conception as 
is sometimes thought to be a trait peculiar to Orientals.13
11 SDZ, vol. 36, p. 247 (italics mine).
12 Suzuki 1904. 
13 Suzuki 1906, p. 34.
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Suzuki’s assertion that “fairness of play to an opponent” comes from 
Zen is also noteworthy in that it suggests the more than 100,000 deaths on 
both sides during the Russo-Japanese War was something akin to a sport-
ing match. That is to say, so long as both sides play by the rules, having an 
equal, i.e., “fair,” opportunity to kill each other, Zen training has accom-
plished its purposes. 
In addition, we catch a glimpse of Suzuki’s attitude toward China, Zen’s 
birthplace, in the same article when he wrote: “[Zen] as a living faith is as 
dead as everything else in that old tottering country.”14 Not a word of recog-
nition here, let alone sympathy, that China might be “tottering” due, at least 
in part, to the imperialist encroachments of foreign countries, Japan included.
Be that as it may, Satō fails to demonstrate that Suzuki opposed the sub-
sequent colonization of Korea in 1910 or the attempted cultural genocide 
perpetrated by the Japanese government against the Korean people for the 
next thirty-five years. In the absence of such statements, and given that it 
was Suzuki himself who enabled his master’s bellicose statements to be pre-
sented to the English-speaking world as authentic expressions of the Buddha-
dharma, it is reasonable to conclude that through at least the early years of 
the twentieth century Suzuki was sympathetic to Japanese imperialism if not 
an outright supporter. If he had a change of heart it would only come later.
Finally, since even Satō admits that Suzuki was a proponent of so-called 
“defensive war,” it is worth noting that the Japanese government (similar to 
all modern governments) presented the Russo-Japanese War to the Japanese 
people as being just that—a purely defensive effort, for it was alleged that a 
Russian takeover of the Korean peninsula, let alone Manchuria, would con-
stitute a mortal threat to Japan. 
However, in the case of the Russo-Japanese War, the only truly mortal 
threat was that posed to the Korean people, for it was their independence 
and well-being that was doomed no matter which of the two imperial-
ist empires emerged victorious. Sōen’s portrayal (with the assistance of 
Suzuki’s translation) of the struggle over which country would control 
Korea (and eventually Manchuria) as a “great and noble task,” moreover a 
task fully in accord with the Buddha-dharma, must be considered as one of 
the great betrayals of that faith. This holds true whether or not one believes 
Buddhism to be strictly pacifist.  
It is also noteworthy that Sōen was one of the first Zen abbots to be edu-
cated in a Western-style university. Further, having successfully completed 
his kōan 公案 training and received inka shōmei 印可証明 at the unusually 
14 Suzuki 1906, p. 17 (italics mine).
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early age of twenty-five, he was considered, at least in the Rinzai Zen sect, to 
be fully enlightened. Thus, decades before the advent of the Asia-Pacific War 
something had gone wrong, very wrong, among Zen Buddhist leaders (and, 
as I reveal in Zen at War, among all of Japan’s institutional Buddhist leaders 
who equally supported Japan’s wars up through 1945). In this, Suzuki played 
at least a supporting role, most especially in promoting this understanding of 
Zen to the English-speaking world.
Suzuki as a Socialist
As Satō properly acknowledges, socialism had a significant impact on 
Suzuki’s thought.  In fact, I would go so far as to identify the socialist influ-
ence on Suzuki as one of the most important factors in understanding his 
later attitude toward society in general and warfare in particular, even his 
understanding of Buddhism. 
Suzuki first described his interest in socialism in a series of letters written 
to his close friend Yamamoto Ryōkichi 山本良吉 (1871–1942). On 6 January 
1901 Suzuki wrote: “Recently I have had a desire to study socialism, for I 
am sympathetic to its views on social justice and equality of opportunity. 
Present-day society (including Japan, of course) must be reformed from the 
ground up. I’ll share more of my thoughts in future letters.”15 
True to his word, on 14 January 1901 Suzuki wrote Yamamoto:
In recent days I have become a socialist sympathizer to an 
extreme degree. However, my socialism is not based on econom-
ics but religion. This said, I am unable to publicly advocate this 
doctrine to the common people because they are so universally 
querulous and illiterate and therefore unprepared to listen to what 
I have to say. However, basing myself on socialism, I intend to 
gradually incline people to my way of thinking though I also 
believe I need to study some sociology.16 
In a 27 February 1902 letter to Yamamoto, then the head teacher at the 
No. 2 Middle School in Kyoto, Suzuki urged the latter to teach socialist 
principles to his students:
Although from its inception opposition to self-seeking has been a 
principle of socialism, if that is something that cannot be put into 
practice all at once, at least you could teach the principle of jus-
tice and clarify the great responsibility (or duty) the wealthy and 
15 SDZ, vol. 36, p. 204 (italics mine).
16 SDZ, vol. 36, p. 206 (italics mine).
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aristocrats have for [the condition of] today’s society. If you feel 
it is too dangerous to oppose the present [social] structure, then 
how about simply hinting at these truths?17
Aside from indicating Suzuki’s strong interest in socialism, these pas-
sages also make it clear that even as early as 1902 Suzuki was aware of 
the danger facing those who taught socialist principles in a Japan that was 
already starting to crack down on what were labeled “dangerous thoughts” 
(kiken shisō 危険思想) imported from the West. This awareness is, I sug-
gest, critically important in explaining why Suzuki never openly advocated 
socialism following his return to Japan in 1909 after a decade-long resi-
dence in the U.S. Yet this did not stop him from proclaiming his socialist 
sympathies to an English-speaking audience in his 1907 book entitled Out-
lines of Mahayana Buddhism:
As long as we live under the present state of things, it is impos-
sible to escape the curse of social injustice and economic inequal-
ity. Some people must be born rich and noble and enjoying a 
superabundance of material wealth, while others must be groaning 
under the unbearable burden imposed upon them by cruel society. 
Unless we make a radical change in our present social organiza-
tion, we cannot expect every one of us to enjoy an equal opportu-
nity and a fair chance. Unless we have a certain form of socialism 
installed which is liberal and rational and systematic, there must 
be some who are economically more favored than others.18 
It is, needless to say, surprising to find a political statement like this in a 
book claiming to be an introduction to the Mahayana school of Buddhism, 
not least of all because Suzuki calls for a “radical change in our present 
social organization.” Yet, when placed in context, this passage is no more 
than an extension of his January 1901 letter to Yamamoto in which Suzuki 
called for society to be “reformed from the ground up” in accordance with 
socialist values. This raises the important question of whether Suzuki ever 
followed through on his commitment to radically reform Japan?
Karma and Social (In)justice
Suzuki’s socialist sympathies could not help but impact on his understand-
ing of one key Buddhist teaching—the doctrine of karma. For centuries 
karma had been invoked, particularly in East Asia, to explain if not justify 
17 SDZ, vol. 36, p. 220.
18 Suzuki 1963, p. 191 (italics mine).
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why some people were born “rich and noble” and others unbearably poor. 
Simply stated, the claim was made that the rich were rich due to the good 
karma they had acquired through their meritorious deeds in this and past 
lives. On the other hand, the poor (and those born with physical impair-
ments) were being punished for the evil deeds of their past.
In Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism, Suzuki made a radical break with 
this traditional view, dismissing its advocates as no more than “pseudo-
Buddhists.” Instead, he claimed:
No, the doctrine of karma certainly must not be understood to 
explain the cause of our social and economical imperfections. 
The region where the law of karma is made to work supreme is 
our moral world, and cannot be made to extend also over our 
economic field. Poverty is not necessarily the consequence of 
evil deeds, nor is plenitude that of good acts. Whether a person is 
affluent or needy is mostly determined by the principle of econ-
omy as far as our present social system is concerned.19
Needless to say, once the cause of poverty was assigned to “our present 
social system” (i.e., a class-based, capitalist society) it was but a short step, 
at least in that era, to view socialism as the means to escape what Suzuki 
called “the curse of social injustice and economic inequality.” Neverthe-
less, it is noteworthy that few if any of Japan’s institutional Buddhist lead-
ers ever took that step, regardless of sectarian affiliation. On the contrary, 
Buddhist leaders condemned advocates of socialism for denying karma and 
promoting what they termed “evil equality.”
It was, in fact, none other than Suzuki’s own master, Shaku Sōen who 
clearly belonged to those Suzuki came to regard as no more than pseudo-
Buddhists. This is shown by the following passage in an address entitled 
“The Law of Cause and Effect, As Taught by the Buddha,” written by Sōen 
(and translated by Suzuki), delivered at the World’s Parliament of Religions 
in September 1893:
We are here enjoying or suffering the effect of what we have done 
in our past lives. . . . We are born in a world of variety; some are 
poor and unfortunate, others are wealthy and happy. The state of 
variety will be repeated again and again in our future lives. But to 
whom shall we complain of our misery? To none but ourselves!”20
19 Suzuki 1963, p. 189.
20 Quoted in Yokoyama 1993, pp. 136–37.
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Given that his own master held sentiments like these, it is little wonder 
that Suzuki failed to name those in Japan whom he considered to be no 
more than pseudo-Buddhists. To have publicly criticized his master was 
simply unthinkable in the deeply Confucian-influenced Japanese Buddhism 
of that day (and even now for that matter). Further, an interesting question 
arises as to whether Sōen, as no more than a “pseudo-Buddhist,” was quali-
fied to authenticate Suzuki’s initial enlightenment experience as he did in 
December 1896, shortly before his disciple’s departure for the U.S.
Be that as it may, Suzuki’s comments reveal the major break he made 
with his Buddhist contemporaries, particularly his own master, a prominent 
and highly respected figure in the Buddhist establishment of his day. Fur-
thermore, the fledgling anti-monarchist socialist ideology that Suzuki would 
have encountered in the U.S. had no place for an emperor, let alone one 
who would be worshipped as a Shinto “living god” (arahito gami 現人神). 
As Suzuki clearly recognized, from the Meiji Restoration of 1868 onwards 
the imperial system in Japan had been used to prop up an economically and 
socially unjust society and an increasingly corrupt and authoritarian state.
Suzuki revealed his thinking about the imperial system in a number of 
letters to Yamamoto beginning on 14 June 1898, the year following his 
arrival in the U.S. According to Suzuki, Japan’s progress as a nation was 
being hindered, among other things, by “the imperial household clinging as 
ever to its past dreams of transcendence and divinity.”21 In a letter to Yama-
moto written at an unknown date in 1903, Suzuki went so far as to deny the 
emperor’s divinity:
At any rate, the [Japanese] people lack a spirit of independence, 
the government claiming to be the representative of the monarch. 
Furthermore, the claim is made that the emperor is a godlike per-
son superior to other humans, and loyalty is defined as following 
his orders. How ridiculous claims like these are!22
Ridiculous or not, the record reveals that Suzuki never publicly made 
comments like the above after returning to Japan in 1909. This is hardly 
surprising, for even in the early 1900s doing so was to invite imprison-
ment and even execution under the charge of lèse majesté. In fact, this was 
exactly what happened to Sōtō Zen priest Uchiyama Gudō 内山愚童 (1874–
1911) who in 1909 wrote the following in a political pamphlet addressed to 
impoverished tenant farmers:
21 Suzuki 1989, pp. 240–41.
22 SDZ, vol. 36, p. 238.
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There are three leeches who suck the people’s blood: the emperor, 
the rich, and the big land owners. . . . The big boss of the pres-
ent government, the emperor, is not the son of the gods as your 
primary school teachers and others would have you believe. The 
ancestors of the present emperor came forth from one corner 
of Kyushu, killing and robbing people as they went. They then 
destroyed their fellow thieves, Nagasune-hiko and others. . . . It 
should be readily obvious that the emperor is not a god if you but 
think about it for a moment.
When it is said that [the imperial dynasty] has continued for 
2,500 years, it may seem as if [the present emperor] is divine, but 
down through the ages the emperors have been tormented by for-
eign opponents and, domestically, treated as puppets by their own 
vassals. . . . Although these are well-known facts, university pro-
fessors and their students, weaklings that they are, refuse to either 
say or write anything about it. Instead, they attempt to deceive 
both others and themselves, knowing all along the whole thing is 
a pack of lies.23
While Suzuki certainly did not express himself as colorfully as Uchi-
yama, it is clear that, ideologically speaking, the two men shared much 
in common, not only in regard to the emperor system but the doctrine of 
karma as well. In the same political pamphlet, Uchiyama wrote:
Is this [your poverty] the result, as Buddhists maintain, of the 
retribution due you because of your evil deeds in the past? Listen, 
friends, if, having now entered the twentieth century, you were to 
be deceived by superstitions like this, you would still be [no bet-
ter than] oxen or horses. Would this please you?24
Is it possible that Suzuki and Uchiyama also shared an understanding of 
Buddhism that led them to embrace socialism in the first place? Unfortu-
nately, Suzuki appears to have left no record of the theoretical relationship 
he saw between Buddhism and socialism. Yet Suzuki had clearly considered 
this question, for the reader will recall that he informed Yamamoto that his 
interest in socialism was “not based on economics but religion.” Uchiyama, 
on the other hand, did leave an explanation, albeit a brief one, written in 
23 Quoted in Victoria 1997, p. 44.
24 Victoria 1997, p. 43.
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1904. In the light of Suzuki’s remarks as introduced above, it is, I suggest, 
not unreasonable to assume that the two men shared the spirit if not the 
exact wording of Uchiyama’s explanation:
As a propagator of Buddhism I teach that “all sentient beings 
have the Buddha nature” and that “within the Dharma there is 
equality, with neither superior nor inferior.” Furthermore, I teach 
that “all sentient beings are my children.” Having taken these 
golden words as the basis of my faith, I discovered that they are 
in complete agreement with the principles of socialism. It was 
thus that I became a believer in socialism.25
Whether or not Suzuki agreed with these sentiments, there can be no ques-
tion that the two men shared much in common, both in terms of their under-
standing of Buddhism and their political ideology.
Nevertheless, there was one very major difference between them—Uchi-
yama dared to openly criticize the emperor system, speak out against the 
Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 and actively work for socialist reform 
in Japan, including land redistribution, even though it would ultimately cost 
him his life. That is to say, Uchiyama, whose political pamphlet was con-
demned in court as “the most heinous book ever written since the beginning 
of Japanese history,” was hung together with ten other left-wing activists on 
the morning of 24 January 1911.26
Suzuki, on the other hand, kept his socialist sympathies well hidden, 
eventually becoming a university professor in the years following his return 
to Japan not to mention a prolific writer on Buddhism and Zen in both 
Japanese and English. Never once did he dare publicly criticize a political 
system his private correspondence indicates he remained growingly critical 
of. For example, in a 19 April 1928 letter written in English to his American 
wife, Beatrice Lane Suzuki, Suzuki describes his reaction to the Japanese 
government’s first expulsions of Marxist professors from the imperial uni-
versities in Kyoto, Tokyo, and Kyushu:
What do you think of these university professors being made to 
resign on account of their communistic bent of study? Before 
long Japan may experience something of Russia or Italy. The 
time is fast approaching. The present cabinet [of Prime Minister 
25 Victoria 1997, p. 41.
26 For further details see “Uchiyama Gudō: Radical Sōtō Zen Priest” in Victoria 1997, pp. 
38–48.
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Tanaka Gi’ichi] ought to be put down and replaced by another. 
Their appeal to physical force is altogether too reactionary.27
In these comments we see a reflection of Suzuki, the “socialist sympa-
thizer” of the early 1900s. In yet another letter written to Beatrice on 24 
July 1932, Suzuki had this to say about Japan’s determination to establish 
the puppet regime of Manchukuo in northern China in the wake of the 
Manchurian Incident of September 1931: “A journey to Peking this summer 
may not be advisable. Trouble is brewing in that part of China, and before 
long war aeroplanes may be hovering around Peking. Japan seems to be 
determined to go on her own way in this matter of Manchuria. I wonder 
how things will end and when.”28
Statements like these, made privately to his wife, reinforce the view 
that Suzuki was very much aware of, and concerned about, Japan’s rapid 
descent into political repression at home and war abroad. Yet his failure to 
publicly voice his concerns, let alone his opposition, suggests that Suzuki 
was one of those professorial “weaklings” whom Uchiyama so strongly 
criticized for their failure to speak out.
Further Considerations
Given the total absence of further references to socialism, let alone criticism 
of the emperor system, in his later public writings, the argument could be 
made that Suzuki’s early interest in socialism was no more than a “youthful 
indiscretion,” one that he later abandoned. If this were the case, he would 
at least escape the charge of having lacked the courage of his convictions 
following his return to Japan, fearful of the negative impact on his career 
were it to become known that he was a “socialist sympathizer to an extreme 
degree.”
As Suzuki himself alluded to above, even in 1902 he was well aware of 
the dangers involved in openly espousing left-wing views in Japan—that 
is, even prior to the well-publicized imprisonment and execution of radical 
Zen priests like Uchiyama. Thus, as with so many intellectuals of his day, 
it is far more likely that Suzuki decided to keep his “dangerous thoughts” 
to himself, rather than risk losing his teaching position, imprisonment and 
possibly even his life. 
Nor should it be forgotten that, having lost his father at age six, Suzuki 
was well acquainted with poverty, not to mention the fact that from 1911 
27 SDZ, vol. 36, pp. 488–89.
28 SDZ, vol. 36, p. 583.
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onwards Suzuki had a family to support, including not only his American 
wife, Beatrice (at least until her death in 1939), but also their adopted son, 
Alan Masaru Suzuki. Suzuki’s saving grace, if it may be called that, lies 
in the fact that even though he abandoned his intention to promote radi-
cal socialist reform in Japan, his political convictions, coupled with his 
extended residence in the West, appear to have prevented him from becom-
ing a fervent emperor-worshipping, xenophobic nationalist. At least in this 
limited respect, and as I think Satō and I both agree, Suzuki was unique 
among Buddhist, especially Zen, leaders up through Japan’s defeat in 
1945.
Yet another factor inhibiting Suzuki’s ability to speak out was his first 
employment upon return to Japan in 1909 as an English lecturer at the 
aristocratic and ultra-conservative Gakushūin 学習院 (Peers School), where 
he taught until 1921, and, concurrently, at Tokyo Imperial University 東京
帝国大学, where he taught until 1914. Note, too, that Suzuki later resigned 
his position at Gakushūin in frustration at incessant criticism from his col-
leagues regarding his marriage to a Westerner, i.e., Beatice Lane. It was not 
until 1921 that he was able to devote himself to teaching Buddhist thought 
at Kyoto’s Shin sect-affiliated Otani University 大谷大学, where he and his 
wife helped found the journal The Eastern Buddhist.
Even here, however, the historical record is not as straightforward as it 
appears to Suzuki admirers like Satō. That is to say, included in the first let-
ter written in English to Beatrice referred to above, we catch a glimpse of 
what might be called Suzuki’s “engagement” with the imperial household:
My going to Tokyo is postponed, and I shall go on Monday, and 
therefore my return to Kyoto will be delayed about two days. I 
will take the Tuesday night train and be in Kyoto on Wednesday 
morning. They are trying to have me see the vice-minister of the 
imperial household, and I do not know if we succeeded this time— 
for I cannot stay much longer in this neighborhood of Tokyo.29
The following day, on 15 January 1928, Suzuki informed his wife: “My 
book will be presented to Emperor [sic] and so forth through the Household 
Department. This may lead to further developments or may not. As my 
friends are trying hard to get Zen well known among the imperial family, I 
am just letting them go on with their plans.”30
29 SDZ, vol. 36, pp. 478–79.
30 SDZ, vol. 36, p. 479.
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There is, of course, something of a mixed message in these comments. 
On the one hand, Suzuki wrote as if he had little personal involvement in 
approaching the throne, leaving this to persons he referred to only as “they” 
and “my friends.” Nevertheless, in his first reference Suzuki also stated that 
he did not know if “we succeeded this time.” Thus, whether these efforts 
were made at Suzuki’s behest or merely with his passive acquiescence 
remains unclear, perhaps reflecting once again his lingering ambivalence 
to the imperial system. This said, two tantalizing questions remain to be 
addressed. Firstly, did this approach to the throne actually lead to anything? 
And secondly, why were Suzuki’s friends “trying hard to get Zen well 
known among the imperial family”?
In answering the first question, Suzuki’s ongoing correspondence with 
his wife reveals that by 11 August, 1931 Suzuki was no longer meeting 
with the vice-minister of the imperial household but was a dinner guest 
of the minister’s superior, Count Makino Nobuaki 牧野伸顕 (1861–1949), 
Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and the most important political advisor to 
Emperor Hirohito 裕仁. Suzuki tells Beatrice how much he enjoyed his 
vegetarian dinner because “Count Makino had some fine tales to tell about 
some of the great figures of the [Meiji] Restoration period. His own father 
was one of the principal actors of those days.”31
Further, on 10 April 1933 Suzuki informed Beatrice that Count Makino 
not only supported the idea of his proposed visit to China but “the Foreign 
Office may help to a certain extent—I mean financially.”32 Just how much 
financial assistance Suzuki received from the Foreign Office is unknown, 
but during his visit to Hangchow in May 1934, Suzuki wrote that it was the 
local Japanese consul who made arrangements for him and his party to meet 
“eminent Buddhists” in the area. At the very least, this suggests Foreign 
Office involvement.33 
While none of this is particularly sinister, it indicates nevertheless that in 
the 1930s Suzuki enjoyed the support of officials at the highest levels of the 
Japanese government, something utterly unthinkable had he been under the 
least suspicion of being anti-war, unpatriotic, or left-wing, let alone critical 
of the emperor system. Thus, from at least 1931 it can be said that whatever 
private misgivings he may have had, Suzuki was well connected to Japan’s 
ruling elite and used these connections to his personal advantage.
31 SDZ, vol. 36, p. 569.
32 SDZ, vol. 36, p. 597.
33 SDZ, vol. 36, p. 610.
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Zen and the Emperor
The historical evidence relating to why Suzuki’s friends were trying to get 
Zen well known among the imperial family is much less clear. A further 
complication is that we do not even know the identity of the friends he 
referred to. Having said this, it is also true that this was a period when the 
Bushido code, based on the alleged unity of Zen and the sword (zenken 
ichinyo 禅剣一如), was receiving ever-increasing interest in a society more 
and more dominated by the military and war. 
In particular, there was heightened interest in Zen practice among Impe-
rial Army officers, an elite force who looked to Zen for the same reason as 
their traditional samurai ancestors had done—to enhance martial prowess on 
the battlefield including the promotion of fearlessness in the face of death 
and absolute and unquestioning loyalty (albeit to the emperor rather than 
one’s feudal lord). In particular, Lt. Col. Sugimoto Gorō 杉本五郎 (1900–
1937), a long-time Zen practitioner and lay disciple of Rinzai Zen Master 
Yamazaki Ekijū 山崎益州 (1882–1961), became one of Japan’s most cel-
ebrated war heroes following his early death on the battlefield in northern 
China in September 1937. As a result he was warmly endorsed by Japan’s 
leading generals when he made the following claim in his book, Taigi 大義 
(Great Duty), published posthumously in 1938:
The Zen that I do is not the Zen of the Zen sect. It is soldier Zen 
(gunjin Zen [軍人禅]). The reason that Zen is important to soldiers 
is that all Japanese, especially soldiers, must live in the spirit of 
the unity of sovereign and subjects, eliminating their ego and get-
ting rid of their self. It is exactly the awakening to the nothing-
ness (mu [無]) of Zen that is the fundamental spirit of the unity of 
sovereign and subjects. Through my practice of Zen I am able to 
get rid of my ego. In facilitating the accomplishment of this, Zen 
becomes, as it is, the true spirit of the imperial military.34 
Sugimoto went on to explain why the Zen spirit was so important in the 
training of soldiers under one’s command:
Within the military, officers must use this [Zen] spirit in the 
training of their troops. In the training of troops mere talk is not 
34 Quoted in Victoria 1997, p. 124 (italics mine). Note that some 1,300,000 copies of Sugi-
moto’s Taigi were printed and distributed throughout Japan, especially to middle schools 
where they were studied in order to inspire the youth facing conscription into the Imperial 
military service.
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enough. If you don’t set the example or put it into practice your-
self, your training is a lie. . . . What one hasn’t seen for oneself 
cannot be taught to one’s troops. As the senior, one must first be 
pure oneself. Otherwise, one cannot serve the state through extin-
guishing and discarding the ego.35
And what did Sugimoto’s master, Yamazaki, think of his distinguished 
disciple’s words, especially his understanding of Zen:
As far as the power of his practice of the Way is concerned, I 
believe he [Sugimoto] reached the point where there was no dif-
ference between him and the chief abbot of this or that branch [of 
Zen]. I think that when a person esteems practice, respects the 
Way, and thoroughly penetrates the self as he did, he is qualified 
to be the teacher of other Zen practitioners. That is how accom-
plished he was. In my opinion his practice was complete.36
In other words, Yamazaki recognized his late disciple as having been fully 
enlightened.
It should also be noted that Sugimoto was not content with using his 
practice of Zen merely to rid himself of his ego. As a corollary, he further 
strived to embrace the state of egolessness (muga 無我). Sugimoto asserted, 
“The essence of the unity of the sovereign and the people is egolessness. 
Egolessness and self-extinction are most definitely not separate states. On 
the contrary, one comes to realize that they are identical.”37
Here the question must be asked, is muga (so beloved by Suzuki and the 
entire Zen school) Buddhist? At first glance, the answer appears self-evident, 
for the doctrine of anātman was one of Buddha Śākyamuni’s core teachings. 
Yet the question must be asked as to whether muga in Japanese, or the typi-
cal English translations, “no-self” or “non-self,” is an accurate translation of 
this Sanskrit term.
Controversially to be sure, I suggest that both the Japanese and English 
translations are fundamentally flawed, for ātman does not simply mean 
“self” but an eternal, unchanging self or soul. Buddha Śākyamuni sought 
to deny the belief that the self was eternal, not that you and I, as temporary 
psychophysical personalities, don’t exist in the conventional sense. As the 
well-known Buddhist scholar-priest Rahula Walpola noted:
35 Victoria 1997, p. 124 (italics mine).
36 Victoria 1997, p. 123.
37 Victoria 1997, p. 123.
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According to the Buddha’s teaching, it is as wrong to hold the 
opinion “I have no self” (which is the annihilationist theory) as to 
hold the opinion “I have a self.” Why? What we call “I,” or “being” 
is only a combination of physical and mental aggregates, which 
are working together interdependently in a flux of momentary 
change within the law of cause and effect. . . . there is nothing 
permanent, everlasting, unchanging and eternal in the whole of 
existence.38
If the above comments seem obvious to even beginning students of Bud-
dhism, they were, sadly, not obvious to proponents of samurai-Zen like the 
famous Rinzai Zen master Takuan 沢庵 (1573–1645). Suzuki quotes Takuan 
as addressing his patron, the highly accomplished swordsman Yagyū Tajima 
no Kami Munenori 柳生但馬守宗矩 (1571–1646) as follows:
The uplifted sword has no will of its own, it is all of emptiness. 
It is like a flash of lightning. The man who is about to be struck 
down is also of emptiness, and so is the one who wields the 
sword. None of them are possessed of a mind that has any sub-
stantiality. As each of them is of emptiness and has no “mind” 
[kokoro], the striking man is not a man, the sword in his hands is 
not a sword, and the “I” who is about to be struck down is like the 
splitting of the spring breeze in a flash of lightning.39
In Takuan, we have a priest, who even today epitomizes Zen “enlighten-
ment” in Japan, telling us that the killing of a human being is of no more 
consequence than “the splitting of the spring breeze in a flash of lightning.” 
And Suzuki, for his part, relates Takuan’s words without the slightest hint 
of disapproval. Compare these words with yet another teaching of Buddha 
Śākyamuni in the Dhammapada, a work dating back to the oldest stratum 
of the Buddhist sutras: “All men tremble at punishment, all men fear death; 
remembering that thou are like unto them, do not strike or slay. All men 
tremble at punishment, all men love life; remembering that thou are like 
unto them, do not strike or slay.”40
In comparing these two quotations, one by the faith’s founder and the 
other by a disciple allegedly sharing the founder’s identical enlightenment, 
it is difficult to accept that both could be members of the same faith. I assert 
38 Walpola 1974, p. 66. 
39 Quoted in Suzuki 1959, p. 114.
40 Babbitt 1965, p. 22 (italics mine). 
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that they are not, for if ever there were a case when a teaching ought to be 
unequivocally rejected as antithetical to the Buddha-dharma it is that of 
Takuan. And needless to say, as early as his 1938 Zen and Japanese Cul-
ture, let alone later writings, Suzuki repeatedly introduced Takuan’s martial-
related quotations without the slightest hint of criticism.
As is well known, the Zen sect has been deeply influenced by the 
Mādhyamika school of Mahayana Buddhism, with its teaching of two levels 
of truth, Absolute and relative. However, by placing an exclusive emphasis 
on absolute truth (Skt. paramārthasatya), Takuan and his like devalued and 
delegitimized relative truth to the point that taking human life was no more 
than “the splitting of the spring breeze in a flash of lightning.” Purposely 
or not, such Zen exponents failed to recognize that, as Buddhist scholar 
Bernard Faure has noted, the Middle Way advocated by the Mādhyamika 
school insists on “the ‘simultaneous vision of the two truths,’ wherein each 
extreme keeps its distinct status. It does not always try to collapse them into 
one undifferentiated reality.”41
Nor was Faure the first to point this out, for as Daigan and Alicia Matsu-
naga write, the Tendai (Ch. Tiantai 天台) school in China, founded by Zhiyi 
智顗 (538–597) in the sixth century, had already shared this concern:
One of the key concepts in Tendai thought was the establishment 
of a threefold category of truth. This was an endeavor to tran-
scend the dichotomy of the traditional Mahāyāna twofold truth 
(absolute and relative) with its inherent dangers of elevating one 
at the expense of the other, and to set forth a synthesis in the form 
of the middle way. . . . In other words, śūnyatā [emptiness] is 
equated with Pratītya-samutpāda [dependent origination] and this 
is declared to be the middle path (madhyamā pratipad) or a tem-
porary name for the expression of truth.42
In other words, while it can be said that the self is ultimately “empty” in 
that it is, like all phenomena, impermanent, this neither negates nor dis-
misses the pain and suffering each one of us experiences in the relative 
world. True Buddhist compassion can never be blind to addressing that 
pain, let alone serving to increase it.
Nevertheless, Zen leaders in Japan, Suzuki included, have effectively 
collapsed these two truths into one undifferentiated reality, thereby provid-
ing Bushido with a corrupted metaphysical foundation. This foundation not 
41 Faure 1991, p. 57 (italics mine).
42 Matsunaga and Matsunaga 1974, p. 154 (italics mine).
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only sanctioned killing, it also valorized the Zen-trained warrior/soldier’s 
willingness to die—in the process of taking life in loyal service to his feudal 
lord (and later the emperor)—as the antinomian expression of full enlight-
enment. And should there be any doubt that Takuan’s teachings were sub-
sequently incorporated into Zen support for Japanese militarism, we need 
look no further than wartime Sōtō Zen leader Ishihara Toshiaki 石原俊明, 
who said in March 1937:
Zen master Takuan taught . . . that in essence Zen and Bushido 
were one. . . . I believe that if one is called upon to die, one 
should not be the least bit agitated. On the contrary, one should 
be in a realm where something called “oneself” does not intrude 
even slightly. Such a realm is no different from that derived from 
the practice of Zen.43
Imperial Army Major Ōkubo Kōichi 大久保弘一 responded in enthusiastic 
agreement with Ishihara’s comments:
[The soldier] must become one with his superior. He must actu-
ally become his superior. Similarly, he must become the order he 
receives. That is to say, his self must disappear. In so doing, when 
he eventually goes onto the battlefield, he will advance when told 
to advance. . . . On the other hand, should he believe that he is 
going to die and act accordingly, he will be unable to fight well. 
What is necessary, then, is that he be able to act freely and with-
out [mental] hindrance.44 
Even prior to the Asia-Pacific War, Japanese soldiers of all ranks were 
indoctrinated with a military program of Bushido-promoting “spiritual edu-
cation” (seishin kyōiku 精神教育). This spiritual education was based on the 
metaphysical foundation of the unities of Zen and the sword, life and death. 
Once trained, Japanese soldiers were dispatched to the battlefield where 
nearly three million of them died “selflessly” even as they killed many more 
millions of Chinese and other “selfless” enemies in the process.45 
43 Quoted in Victoria 1997, p. 103. Note that Ishihara was the editor-in-chief of the pan-
Buddhist magazine Daihōrin 大法輪 (Great Dharma Wheel) and therefore exerted influence 
well beyond the Sōtō Zen sect with which he was affiliated.
44 Victoria 1997, p. 103.
45 There are a variety of calculations regarding the number of deaths in the Asia-Pacific 
War. In particular, there is a wide range of views regarding the number of Chinese who were 
killed. Respected historian John Dower estimates that at least ten million Chinese perished. 
Chinese historians typically put the figure at twenty million or more.
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The fact that, even today (both in Japan and the West), this corrupted Zen 
understanding of “no-self,” i.e., selflessness, has remained largely unchal-
lenged cannot but be regarded as one of the world’s most successful reli-
gious deceptions. Although omitting the specifics, the Buddhist scholar and 
translator Thomas Cleary noted: “[M]ilitarism has distorted Zen along with 
the rest of Japanese culture. . . . Japanese people today are just as suscepti-
ble to being deceived by deviant Zen as are Westerners, with the result that 
the various conflicting elements in modern Zen are generally not analyzed 
for what they really are.”46
Suzuki apologists like Satō will no doubt find it extremely unfair to link 
Suzuki to the emperor-worshipping militarist if not fanatic Zen advocated 
by Sugimoto and his master, Yamazaki Ekijū, let alone those many other 
wartime Zen leaders who thought and acted similarly. Yet, even though 
Suzuki clearly did not extol the connection between Zen and the emperor, 
the question remains—where in his many books and articles does Suzuki 
openly criticize, let alone oppose, this militarist understanding of Zen? On 
the contrary, I find Suzuki even surpassed Sugimoto’s claims for “egoless-
ness” when in the 1959 edition of Zen and Japanese Culture he provided the 
following antinomian rationalization for taking life: “Without the sense of an 
ego, there is no moral responsibility, but the divine transcends morality.”47
Further, according to Suzuki those compelled to take up the sword (as 
Japan claimed was the case at the time of its full-scale invasion of China in 
1937) have “no desire to harm anybody, but the enemy appears and makes 
himself a victim. It is as though the sword performs automatically its func-
tion of justice, which is the function of mercy.”48 Still further, in what must 
surely rank as one of the most questionable rationalizations of a warrior-
killer and his sword, Suzuki proclaimed, “[the sword] is no more a weapon 
of self-defense or an instrument of killing, and the swordsman turns into 
an artist of the first grade, engaged in producing a work of genuine origi-
nality.”49 Although Suzuki published these words in the postwar era, just 
how inane they are can be seen when applied to an infamous incident that 
occurred during the “Rape of Nanking” in December 1937. In front-page 
news in Japan at the time, two Imperial Army officers engaged in a contest 
to see who would be first to cut off the heads of one hundred defenseless 
Chinese prisoners of war with their swords. Did each of these POWs “make 
himself a victim”? 
46 Cleary 1991, p. 119.
47 Suzuki 1959, p. 144 (italics mine).
48 Suzuki 1959, p. 145 (italics mine). 
49 Suzuki 1959, p. 145.
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At this point I am certain that Satō would take great exception, if not 
umbrage, at the preceding quotations, pointing out that Suzuki often 
mentioned Zen has a moral standard by which to judge the appropriate-
ness of martial acts. That is to say, the art of swordsmanship contains two 
types of sword, i.e., “the sword that kills” and “the sword that gives life.” 
Accordingly, the “unity of Zen and the sword” which Suzuki so fervently 
embraced is connected solely to the latter “defensive” type. Commentators 
like myself, Satō would claim, do a great injustice to Suzuki (and reveal 
their own ignorance/prejudice) when they claim otherwise.
In theory, I would be the first to admit that the sword that gives life 
appears to be a moral, even spiritual, concept. In particular, it absolves Zen 
of responsibility for aggressive warfare that is by definition self-seeking 
in nature and therefore clearly associated with the sword that kills. Yet, in 
practice, when did any Japanese Zen leader, Suzuki included, ever publicly 
state that any, or even one, of the many wars Japan fought from the Sino-
Japanese War of 1894–1895 up through to the defeat in August 1945 was, 
in fact, associated with the sword that kills? Can Satō provide us with a sin-
gle, solitary example of Suzuki or any other Zen leader, lay or cleric, who 
clearly and publicly spoke out in this way prior to Japan’s defeat in 1945? 
If not, was it a case that they were all too afraid to do so despite the “iron 
will” that Suzuki claimed Zen could provide practitioners when necessary? 
Or, with the exception of Suzuki’s private opposition to the war with the 
U.S. and Great Britain, did Japanese Zen leaders believe, enlightened as 
they claimed to be, that Japan was actually wielding the sword that gives 
life in the numerous imperialist wars Japan fought during this period?
If Zen leaders had wished to clearly differentiate between the two types of 
sword in terms of Japan’s wartime foreign policy, there was no better oppor-
tunity than in September 1940 at the signing of the Tripartite Pact between 
Japan, Germany and Italy. Celebrating this military alliance, the Japanese 
ambassador to Germany, Kurusu Saburō 来栖三郎 (1886–1954) spoke as fol-
lows: “The pillar of the Spirit of Japan is to be found in Bushido. Although 
Bushido employs the sword, its essence is not to kill people, but rather to 
use the sword that gives life to people. Using the spirit of this sword, we 
wish to contribute to world peace.”50
By 1940 Japan’s desire to “contribute to world peace” was on display 
for the entire world to see in that it was in the fourth year of its full-scale 
invasion of China in anything but a defensive war. Yet, did Suzuki or any 
other Zen leader publicly criticize Ambassador Kurusu for his patently false 
50 Quoted in Victoria 2006, p. 112.
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assertion that Japan was joining a military pact with Nazi Germany and 
Fascist Italy solely to employ the sword that gives life?  Needless to say, 
none of them voiced such criticism. In fact, as far as Suzuki is concerned, 
how would it have been possible for him to make such a criticism when in 
1938 he had written that Zen was so “extremely flexible” that it could be 
attached to fascism (or any other “ism”). Specifically, Suzuki wrote:
Zen has no special doctrine or philosophy, no set of concepts or 
intellectual formulas except that it tries to release one from the 
bondage of birth and death, by means of certain intuitive modes of 
understanding peculiar to itself. It is therefore extremely flexible 
in adjusting itself to almost any philosophy and moral doctrine so 
long as its intuitive teaching is not interfered with. It may be found 
wedded to anarchism or fascism, communism or democracy, athe-
ism or idealism, or any political or economic dogmatism.51 
According to Satō, Suzuki did not really mean what he appeared to mean 
here. That is, in the first instance Satō claims that Suzuki liked to write “a 
bit on the provocative side.”52 More importantly, in the above quote, Suzuki 
was not referring to the Zen school or tradition as such but solely to the act 
of “meditation,” the original meaning of the word “zen” 禅 (Ch. chan, Skt. 
dhyāna). Interestingly, is this not what Lt. Col. Sugimoto meant when he 
claimed above that the Zen he practiced was not the Zen of the Zen sect, 
but, rather, it was Zen, i.e., meditation, that enabled him to rid himself of 
his ego so as to fully become one with the emperor and loyally follow his 
orders? I ask, where in Suzuki’s voluminous prewar or wartime public 
writings, in either English or Japanese, do we read a criticism of this use 
of Zen-induced “egolessness” to inculcate total loyalty to the state and the 
emperor? 
Satō goes on to claim that the reason Zen, as simply meditation, can be 
linked to fascism or any other “ism” is because it is “value-neutral” and 
as such, “it can be employed equally for either good or evil.”53 This asser-
tion raises the critically important question—is Buddhist meditation (as 
compared to other meditative traditions) really value-neutral? Is Suzuki 
therefore correct in asserting that “Zen” can be linked to any credo or “ism” 
whatsoever?
51 Suzuki 1959, p. 63 (italics mine).
52 Satō 2008, p. 98.
53 Satō 2008, p. 99 (italics mine).
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The Nature of Buddhist Meditation
Controversially to be sure, I assert that while Satō (and Suzuki) are quite 
correct about the value-neutral nature of Zen meditation, this is actually 
the crux of the problem. That is to say, when Zen meditation is regarded as 
completely value-neutral (as it typically has been in Zen history) it is NOT 
Buddhist meditation!
To understand why I say this I ask readers, particularly those who are 
themselves in the Zen tradition, to be open to an insight from the Thera-
vada school of Buddhism. In the Gopaka Moggallāna-sutta (Moggallāna 
the Guardsman), Ānanda, one of Buddha Śākyamuni’s chief disciples, 
points out to Vassakara (the chief minister of the country of Magadha), that 
Śākyamuni did not praise every form of meditation:
What kind of meditation, Brahman, did the Lord [Śākyamuni] 
not praise? . . . He [who] dwells with his thought obsessed by ill-
will, and does not comprehend as it really is the escape from the 
ill-will that has arisen; he, having made ill-will the main thing, 
meditates on it, meditates absorbed, meditates more absorbed, 
meditates quite absorbed. . . . The Lord does not praise this kind 
of meditation, Brahman.54 
Meditating “obsessed by ill-will” is not, of course, the only misuse to 
which meditation can be put. Śākyamuni also criticized meditation obsessed 
with “sensual passion,” “sloth and drowsiness,” “restlessness and anxiety,” 
and “skeptical doubt,” collectively known as the “five hindrances” (Pāli, 
pañca nīvara ṇāni). Further, it should be noted that the word translated as 
“meditation” above is samādhi (in both Pāli and Sanskrit). Samādhi, of 
course, refers to the state of mental one-pointedness or concentration most 
readily, though not exclusively, achieved through the practice of meditation 
in the seated, cross-legged position, i.e., zazen.
Significantly, the Pāli word for these five mistaken types of samādhi, 
i.e., micchā-samādhi, seems to have no Mahayana equivalent. It appears 
not only the Zen school but Mahayana Buddhism as a whole have refused, 
purposely or not, to recognize that samādhi can be misused. Note, too, that 
the promise of employing the mental power arising out of samādhi, i.e., 
zenjōriki 禅定力, in warfare first made Zen attractive to the warrior class in 
feudal Japan and later, the modern Japanese military, most especially its 
officer corps.
54 Walshe 1987, pp. 63–64 (italics mine).
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The argument can be made, of course, that neither during Japan’s medi-
eval period nor its subsequent militarist epoch did Zen masters urge their 
warrior/military followers to practice zazen “obsessed with ill-will.” Yet, 
one of the distinguishing features of Buddhist ethics is its stress on “inten-
tionality.” That is to say, to determine whether an action is wholesome/skill-
ful (Pāli kusala, Skt. kuśala) one must look at its impelling cause or motive. 
An act is considered unwholesome if it is rooted in one or more of the three 
poisons, i.e., greed, hatred and delusion, while it is wholesome if rooted in 
non-greed (i.e., generosity), non-hatred (loving kindness or compassion), 
and non-delusion (wisdom). 
In the case of Zen masters like Takuan under feudalism or Yamazaki 
Ekijū under militarism, their instructions and writings leave no doubt they 
were well aware of their disciples’ intention to use the concentrated mental 
state arising out of meditation as the basis for enhancing their martial prow-
ess on the battlefield even while fully prepared to die themselves. Neverthe-
less, there is no record that any of these masters opposed or even questioned 
their disciples’ lethal intent. On the contrary, Yamazaki repeatedly lauded 
his military disciple’s use of samādhi-power on the battlefield. Similarly, 
D. T. Suzuki never publicly questioned or opposed the battlefield use of 
samādhi-power up through to Japan’s defeat in August 1945. 
In short, if one accepts the prescriptions elucidated in the Gopaka 
Moggallāna-sutta as normative for Buddhist meditation, then “value-neu-
tral” Zen meditation, in which any form of samādhi is acceptable regardless 
of intent, is clearly not Buddhist. And make no mistake, the use of samādhi-
power in battle has only one purpose in mind, the destruction of one’s 
opponent. 
My research leads me to conclude that the Zen school failed many cen-
turies ago to recognize that Buddhist meditation is not “value-neutral” in 
the sense that Buddha Śākyamuni did not recognize every form of medita-
tion as an expression of the Buddha-dharma. The very essence of Buddhist 
meditation is to promote, or better said, to realize the identity of self and 
others, all “others.” How then, could one, having genuinely had that recog-
nition/experience, either engage in or promote warfare that seeks to destroy 
others? To be unaware of this truth is a singular and manifestly dangerous 
misunderstanding of the Buddha-dharma. Fortunately, this danger is recog-
nized in the Theravada tradition and is furthermore entirely consistent with 
Buddha Śākyamuni’s fundamental teachings of compassion and nonvio-
lence. The question is whether Mahayana adherents, most especially in the 
Zen school, will admit their error and embrace this teaching? 
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Chan/Zen, the State and War
Viewed in terms of its historical development, it can be argued that Zen was 
the victim of something akin to a hijacking. However, this particular hijack-
ing occurred over such an extended period of time that the victims were sel-
dom conscious of being “taken for a ride,” let alone taken against their will. 
One example of this occurred a full millennium prior to the advent of the 
“soldier-Zen” promoted by Sugimoto and his Rinzai master. As early as the 
eighth century, a famous Chinese writer by the name of Liang Su 梁肅 (753–
793) criticized Chan’s lack of ethical standards as follows: 
Nowadays, few men have true faith. Those who travel the path of 
Ch’an go so far as to teach the people that there is neither Buddha 
nor Dharma, and that neither good nor evil has any significance. 
When they preach these doctrines to the average man, or men 
below average, they are believed by all those who live their lives 
of worldly desires. Such ideas are accepted as great truths that 
sound so pleasing to the ear. And the people are attracted to them 
just as moths in the night are drawn to their burning death by the 
candlelight.55 
In reading this, one is tempted to believe that Liang was also a prophet, 
able to foresee that, over a thousand years later, millions of young Japanese 
men would be drawn to their own burning deaths by the Zen-influenced 
“light” of Bushido. When we add the many more millions of innocent 
men, women, and children who burned with (or because of) them, we truly 
understand what Liang meant when he concluded the preceding quote with 
these words: “Such doctrines are as injurious and dangerous as the devil 
(i.e., Māra) and the ancient heretics.” 
Even more to the point, the French scholar Paul Demiéville notes that, 
according to the seventh-century Chan text “Treatise on Absolute Con-
templation,” killing is evil only in the event the killer fails to recognize his 
victim as empty and dream-like. On the contrary, if one no longer sees his 
opponent as a living being separate from emptiness, then he is free to kill 
him at will.56 This early antinomian license to kill with moral impunity 
reveals that soldier-Zen was not some medieval invention of the Zen school 
in Japan by priests like Takuan (let alone Suzuki). Nor was it a recent or 
momentary aberration resulting from the advent of Japanese militarism in 
55 Quoted in Chen 1964, p. 357 (italics mine).
56 Demiéville 1973, p. 296.
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the 1930s. Instead, its roots can be traced back to the very emergence of 
Chan in China.
Further proof of this is supplied by events connected to the life of 
Huineng 慧能 (638–713), traditionally seen as the pivotal sixth patriarch of 
the Southern School of Chan. On the one hand, the Caoxi dashi biezhuan 
曹渓大師別伝 (Special Transmission of the Great Master from Caoxi) pres-
ents this master as being so unconcerned with worldly fame that he refused 
an invitation from the emperor to visit the imperial court. Despite this, the 
emperor nevertheless presented him with gifts, one of which was, signifi-
cantly, a new name for his former residence, i.e., Guoensi 国恩寺 (Temple to 
Repay the Debt of Gratitude owed the State).
More to the point, Huineng’s disciple Shenhui 神会 (684–758) maintained 
a much closer, if sometimes strained, relationship with the imperial court. 
In 720 Shenhui took up residence in Nanyang 南陽, not far south of the 
imperial capital of Luoyang 洛陽, in obedience to an imperial decree. In 745 
Shenhui moved to a temple in Luoyang where large crowds were drawn to 
hear his exposition of Chan teachings. His success, however, led to charges, 
perhaps incited by rivals in the so-called Northern Chan School, that he was 
fomenting social unrest, resulting in his banishment from the capital for 
three years (753–756).
In the meantime, in 755, a major rebellion broke out in the northeast-
ern part of the country, and, remembering his popularity, the government 
recalled Shenhui to the capital, this time as a fundraiser for the imperial 
military. By offering contributors exemption from both monetary taxation 
and the requirement to participate in yearly, government-sponsored labor 
battalions, Shenhui proved an exemplary fundraiser and the rebellion was 
suppressed. The emperor gratefully showered Shenhui with honors ensuring 
that his last days were spent “basking in the graces of the powers that be.”57
In light of this and similar episodes, it can be said that early Chan leaders 
also willingly served the state’s needs, in war as well as in peace. In fact, it 
can be argued that when both the Sōtō and Rinzai sects raised funds to buy 
fighters and other aircraft for the Japanese military in the 1930s and 1940s, 
they were merely following a Chan/Zen precedent with a history of nearly 
1200 years!
By the Sung dynasty (960–1279) Chan monasteries had not only main-
tained friendly relations with the imperial court but had also become 
involved in political affairs. Emperors granted noted Chan masters purple 
robes and honorific titles such as “Chan Master of the Buddha Fruit” (Foguo 
57 Dumoulin 1988, p. 114.
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chanshih 仏果禅師) or “Chan Master of Full Enlightenment” (Yuanwu chan-
shih 円悟禅師). In return, Chan temples operating under imperial patronage 
were expected to pray for the emperor and the prosperity of the state. In 
describing this system, Yanagida Seizan, one of Japan’s most distinguished 
Zen scholars, writes: 
Given the danger of foreign invasion from the north, Buddhism 
was used to promote the idea of the state and its people among 
the general populace. . . . Inevitably, the Chan priests residing in 
these government temples in accordance with imperial decree 
gradually linked the content of their teaching to the goals of the 
state. This is not unconnected to the fact that Zen temples [in 
Japan] in the Kamakura and Tokugawa periods had . . . a nation-
alistic character in line with the traditional consciousness of the 
Chinese Chan school that advocated the spread of Chan in order 
to protect the nation.58 
In Japan, with the establishment of the Kamakura Shogunate (military 
government) in 1192, real political power came to be exercised by the 
leaders of the warrior class. It was at this time that Zen as an independent 
school of Buddhism was introduced to Japan, and it was to this class that 
the straightforward, rigorous, and austere doctrines and practice of Zen 
appealed. In addition, Zen had the advantage of being a direct import from 
China, thereby offering the new government the opportunity to escape the 
embrace of the large, nobility-dominated earlier Buddhist monastic institu-
tions in the Nara and Kyoto areas.
On the one hand, the Zen school made undeniable contributions to Japa-
nese culture, especially the arts, as well as the economy and even diplo-
macy with China. At the same time, it also made an even more “practical” 
contribution to the warrior class by placing the spiritual power emanating 
from the practice of Zen meditation at the disposal of the warrior class for 
use in battle. In Zen and Japanese Culture, Suzuki describes the way in 
which Shōgun Hōjō Tokimune 北条時宗 (1251–1284) sought strength from 
Zen to deal with the threat of a second Mongol invasion. Tokimune, a long-
time Zen practitioner, went for guidance to his spiritual mentor, Chinese 
Zen Master Zuyuan 祖元 (1226–1286), shortly before the expected invasion 
in 1281.
When Tokimune said, “The greatest event of my life is here at last,” the 
master asked, “How will you face it?” Tokimune replied by merely shouting 
58 Yanagida 1967, pp. 96–97 (italics mine). 
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the exclamatory word: “Katsu!” as though he were frightening all of his ene-
mies into submission. Pleased with this show of courage, Zuyuan indicated 
his approval of Tokimune’s answer by saying, “Truly, a lion’s child roars 
like a lion.”59 Though somewhat lesser known, a similar incident is recorded 
as early as the first Mongol invasion in 1274. This one involved a second 
Chinese Zen master by the name of Daxiu Zhengnian 大休正念 (1214–1289). 
At the time, Daxiu Zhengnian directed Tokimune to solve the famous kōan 
concerning Zhaozhou Congshen 趙州従諗 (778–897) on whether or not a 
dog has the Buddha nature. Zhaozhou’s answer was simply “mu” (lit. nil/
naught). Tokimune is said to have solved this kōan, “thereby releasing his 
mind to deal calmly with the grave issues of war and peace.”60
Collectively, these two incidents appear to be the earliest indications of 
the unity of Zen and the sword in Japan, though it is noteworthy that neither 
of them involved Japanese Zen masters. Rather, it was Chinese Zen mas-
ters who first introduced the idea of applying a “value-neutral” form of Zen 
meditation to warfare, or at least in developing the right mental attitude for 
it. In one sense, this is hardly surprising since Chinese Buddhism, just as in 
Japan, had long ago accepted that one of its primary purposes was to “protect 
the state” (Jp. gokoku-bukkyō 護国仏教) employing magico-ritualistic means 
to do so. The Chan/Zen innovation was to accomplish similar goals by 
offering the spiritual power emanating from meditation to Japan’s warrior 
rulers for use in warfare.
Furthermore, by the time Zen was introduced into Japan, Confucian val-
ues had effectively replaced the original equalitarian nature of Buddhist 
social ethics.  This is seen, for example, in the person of Gidō Shūshin 義堂
周信 (1325–1388), Rinzai Zen abbot first of Engakuji in Kamakura and later 
of Nanzenji in Kyoto. Gidō confidently taught Shōgun Ashikaga Yoshimitsu 
足利義満 (1358–1408) that, while it was impossible for Confucian teach-
ings to contain Buddhism, it was quite possible for Buddhism to contain 
Confucianism. In claiming this, Gidō failed to recognize that the price of 
“containing Confucianism” would, over the long term, be the wholesale 
incorporation into Zen of the hierarchically-based Confucian ethical system. 
This system focused on the creation of “social harmony” through inculcat-
ing subordinates with feelings of absolute and unquestioning loyalty toward 
their superiors, be they feudal lord, military superior, or emperor (or, today, 
the corporate leaders who collectively constitute “Japan, Inc.”). 
59 Quoted in Suzuki 1959, p. 66.
60 Quoted in Sansom 1978, p. 431.
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During the Tokugawa period (1600–1868), Rinzai Zen Master Takuan, 
whom Suzuki so often quotes admiringly, clearly revealed what “value-neu-
tral” (or perhaps better said “value-neutered”) Zen meditation had to offer 
the samurai swordsman. In the following letter Takuan addresses his war-
rior patron Yagyū Tajima no Kami Munenori and explains to him how the 
mind that first transcended discriminating thought in meditation, technically 
known in Zen as “no-mind” (mushin 無心), can be employed to enhance 
martial prowess, particularly the use of the sword: 
‘No-mind’ applies to all activities we may perform, such as danc-
ing, as it does to swordplay. The dancer takes up the fan and 
begins to stamp his feet. If he has any idea at all of displaying his 
art well, he ceases to be a good dancer, for his mind ‘stops’ with 
every movement he goes through. In all things, it is important to 
forget your ‘mind’ and become one with the work at hand.
When we tie a cat, being afraid of its catching a bird, it keeps 
on struggling for freedom. But train the cat so that it would not 
mind the presence of a bird. The animal is now free and can go 
anywhere it likes. In a similar way, when the mind is tied up, 
it feels inhibited in every move it makes, and nothing will be 
accomplished with any sense of spontaneity. Not only that, the 
work itself will be of poor quality, or it may not be finished at all. 
Therefore, do not get your mind ‘stopped’ with the sword you 
raise; forget what you are doing, and strike the enemy.61
The Zen advocated by Takuan and his fellow Zen masters was not only 
able to enhance the warrior’s prowess on the battlefield, equally if not more 
important was its ability to promote the supreme Confucian value of abso-
lute loyalty. In his work, Fudōchi shinmyō roku 不動智神妙録 (The Mysteries 
of Immovable Wisdom), Takuan wrote:
To be totally loyal means first of all to rectify your mind, disci-
pline your body, and be without the least duplicity toward your 
lord. You must not hate or criticize others, nor fail to perform your 
daily duties. . . . If the spirit in which the military arts are practiced 
is correct, you will enjoy freedom of movement, and though thou-
sands of the enemy appear, you will be able to force them to sub-
mit with only one sword. This is [the meaning of] great loyalty.62 
61 Quoted in Suzuki 1962, p. 458 (italics mine). 
62 Quoted in Ichikawa 1982, pp. 89–90 (italics mine). 
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Hopefully the above at least hints at the possibility that the Chan/Zen 
connection to violence, let alone its subservience to the state, is long-stand-
ing, dating back almost to the time of its emergence in China and continu-
ing (if not becoming stronger) following its introduction to Japan. It is clear 
that this could not have been done without first converting Buddhist medita-
tion into its value-neutral Zen equivalent. The cost, however, was that when 
under pressure from above, e.g., feudal warrior patrons and most especially 
the modern state, Zen became “unhinged,” thereby losing its internal moral 
compass and its Buddhist identity, with only the outer shell remaining.
In claiming this, I am most emphatically not asserting that all Zen medi-
tation, past or present, is necessarily un-Buddhist in nature. For example, 
when Sōtō Zen priest and ardent Zen practitioner Uchiyama Gudō was 
mounting the scaffold steps about to be hung, the True Pure Land (Shin) 
Buddhist prison chaplain in attendance later related that he was so moved 
by the equanimity Uchiyama radiated that he could not stop himself from 
bowing deeply as Uchiyama passed by. That is to say, the man whose job it 
was to comfort the condemned was himself comforted.63 While not neces-
sarily meant as an affirmation of Uchiyama’s political ideology per se, his 
unyielding, nonviolent resistance to Japan’s imperialist aggression abroad 
and social injustice at home nevertheless demonstrates the internalization 
of the Buddhist understanding that, to use his words (and those of the Lotus 
Sutra), “all sentient beings are my children.”
Understood in this light the fundamental problem is that a “value-neutral” 
understanding of Zen meditation readily lends itself to abandonment of its 
Buddhist character when called upon (or pressured) to do so by the state 
and its rulers. No doubt Satō would assert that Zen already has mecha-
nisms available to prevent itself from being co-opted by the state, e.g., the 
distinction between a positive or moral life-giving sword and a negative 
or immoral life-taking sword, not to mention such concepts as compas-
sion, benevolence, and magnanimity. But as we have already seen above, 
let alone the many similar examples I present in Zen at War, it was exactly 
words like these that were used to justify Japan’s aggression against its 
neighbors, most especially China. 
The Chinese were being killed, Japan’s Zen leaders claimed, out of “com-
passion” for them, i.e., to “correct” their evil ways. Rinzai Zen scholar-
priest Hitane Jōzan went so far as to say: “We will help the Chinese live as 
true Orientals. It would therefore not be unreasonable to call this a sacred 
63 For more background on Uchiyama, see Victoria 2006, pp. 38–48.
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war incorporating the great practice of a bodhisattva.”64 This is certainly 
one instance in which the insightfulness (and need) of the Zen insistence on 
“no reliance on words and letters” (Jp. furyū monji 不立文字) could not be 
clearer. 
It is exactly because words can be twisted to mean anything their speaker 
wishes that internalizing (i.e., becoming one with) the values/insights taught 
by Buddhism, including practicing “loving kindness” even toward one’s 
alleged enemies, are the sine qua non of any form of meditation that is truly 
Buddhist in nature. It is only after the true meaning of these concepts has 
been successfully internalized that they can be manifested in the life of the 
practitioner come what may. In other words, they must be transformed from 
mental constructs into the living reality of the practitioner.  
When properly understood, what has been introduced above will go a 
long way in answering a question that Satō raised, but failed to answer, i.e., 
how was it possible that so many (if not all) of Japan’s leading wartime Zen 
masters nevertheless became such fervent, even fanatical, supporters of 
Japanese militarism? By now the answer should be clear—while these mas-
ters may indeed have been enlightened in terms of a “value-neutral” form 
of Zen meditation, they were not enlightened in terms of Buddhist medita-
tion, i.e., the type of meditation that Buddha Śākyamuni actually advocated. 
I invite those who disagree to put forth their arguments to the contrary.   
Conclusion
My research leads me to the conclusion that it was not Suzuki or his fel-
low wartime Zen leaders who were responsible for having turned Zen into 
a war-affirming if not fanatical creed, but rather, they honestly reflected 
what the Zen school, with its value-neutral meditation yoked to hierarchical 
Confucian social ethics, had long ago become—a “selfless” servant of the 
state and its leaders in which absolute loyalty was promoted as the highest 
good. Suzuki and his fellow Zen leaders were neither the creators of these 
Zen characteristics, any more than they “distorted” the nature of value-
neutral, and thereby violence-enabling, Zen meditation, coupled as it was to 
metaphysical presuppositions based on a false understanding of the absolute 
and relative worlds. That is to say, they conflated these two worlds with the 
relative disappearing into the absolute never to be considered, or valued, 
again. Instead, these Zen leaders faithfully proclaimed and promoted these 
64 Quoted in Victoria 2006, p. 134.
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long-standing characteristics of Zen to the people of wartime Japan and, in 
Suzuki’s case, to the people of the English-speaking world as well.
Although I lump Suzuki together with other more extreme wartime Zen 
leaders, this does not mean that I regard them as identical. That is to say, 
within the Zen community of his day Suzuki was truly “one of a kind.” 
Unlike his Zen contemporaries, Suzuki clearly did not engage in the pro-
motion of emperor-worship nor identify the Asia-Pacific War as a “holy” 
undertaking fought against the demonic Americans and British (kichiku 
beiei 鬼畜米英). (After all, Suzuki had numerous friends in both countries.) 
This is to Suzuki’s credit and places him in a unique category vis-à-vis the 
other fervent Zen supporters of Japanese militarism.
Nevertheless, Suzuki was an active participant in the events of his day. 
Notwithstanding Satō’s protestations to the contrary, while yet a young 
man Suzuki published a book, A New Theory of Religion, that was not 
only extremely nationalistic but established the theoretical groundwork for 
religion in modern Japan to serve as a loyal servant of the state in times 
of peace and war. In so doing, Suzuki revealed his complete ignorance of 
an insight described by engaged Buddhist scholar David Loy as “wego” 
(as opposed to “ego”), a term he applied to the state (among other entities) 
that in reality is: “a collective identity created by discriminating one’s own 
group from another. As in the personal ego, the ‘inside’ is opposed to the 
other ‘outside,’ and this makes conflict inevitable, not just because of com-
petition with other groups, but because the socially constructed nature of 
group identity means that one’s own group can never feel secure enough.”65
Thus, conflict between nations, fundamentally based on the collective 
greed of each “wego” state, is integral to the very structure of all states as 
they exist today. So-called “defensive wars,” that states inevitably claim to 
be fighting, are no more than convenient, if effective, facades to disguise 
the pursuit of national aggrandizement, euphemistically known as the 
“national interest.”
Furthermore, when, inevitably, the “wego”-constituted nation enters 
into war, Suzuki was an advocate for the utter subservience of religion to 
the massive slaughter accompanying modern warfare, incorporating the 
denigration of the worth of the individual soldier and, by extension, the 
worth of all Japanese during wartime. Whatever moral requirements Suzuki 
may have placed on the state in theory had no real meaning in practice, 
something he himself demonstrated all too clearly by the joy he expressed 
65 Loy 2009. 
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upon hearing of the initial Japanese naval victories at the beginning of the 
Russo-Japanese War, a war between two rival imperialisms over the right to 
control Korea and, secondarily, Manchuria.
And as far as Zen is concerned, as early as 1906 we find Suzuki touting 
Zen’s influence on Bushido and “the inspiration the combination of these 
two provided Japan’s victorious soldiers” to the English-speaking world. 
This was written only two years after Suzuki had praised the “brilliant start” 
of the war. Nor should it be forgotten that the Bushido code, lit. “Way of the 
Warrior,” was, Suzuki’s idealized portrait notwithstanding, a brutal code to 
be adhered to in the process of loyally vanquishing, i.e., nearly always kill-
ing, the designated enemies of one’s feudal lord (including the women and 
children of entire families if need be). A process, moreover, in which one’s 
own life counted for nothing (which Zen claimed it ultimately was), i.e., of 
no more worth symbolically than “goose feathers.” 
Suzuki continued to tout the intimate connection between Zen and 
Bushido in English in his 1938 book Zen Buddhism and Its Influence on 
Japanese Culture (reprinted in the postwar era as Zen and Japanese Cul-
ture). Significantly, the Japanese edition of this book was met with domes-
tic acclaim in 1940, and, as even Satō admits, Suzuki continued to write 
uncritically about Zen’s relationship to Bushido until the early 1940s, i.e., 
long after Japan had begun its full-scale invasion of China on 7 July 1937. 
Though not yet at war with the U.S., Japan very much needed to maintain, 
if not enhance, the fighting spirit (and willingness to die) of both Japanese 
soldiers and civilians alike.
It is true that, as Satō noted, Suzuki did not embrace the extreme form 
of racist nationalism associated with the alleged superiority of the Japa-
nese people as a divine “race,” headed by a divine emperor ruling over a 
divine nation, a notion encapsulated in the terms “Yamato spirit” (Yamato-
damashii 大和魂) and a peerless kokutai 国体 (national polity). Yet, this was 
not because Suzuki had a deeper understanding of Buddhism than his war-
mongering Zen contemporaries, nor because his own enlightenment experi-
ence was more authentic than theirs.
In the first instance we find Suzuki parting way with his peers, even his 
own Zen Master Shaku Sōen, over his opposition to the socially reactionary 
understanding of karma then prevalent in Japan.  However, this was not due 
to Suzuki’s deeper understanding of Buddhism but to his newly-found affin-
ity to socialism acquired during his residence in the U.S. An affinity so pro-
found that Suzuki became determined to reform Japan’s oppressive social 
structure “from the ground up.” Yet, even as he made this pledge in private 
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letters to a Japanese friend while still in the U.S., he was already aware of 
the dangers involved, dangers that would only increase with the passage 
of time. Hence, following Suzuki’s return to Japan in 1909 we never again 
hear of his plans for socialist reform.
Instead, by the 1930s we learn that Suzuki’s “friends” were seeking to 
bring his writings to the attention of none other than the emperor himself. 
While it is not clear whether they were successful, Suzuki was neverthe-
less able to meet and dine with Count Makino Nobuaki, Lord Keeper of the 
Privy Seal and Emperor Hirohito’s most important political advisor, thereby 
garnering financial support for Suzuki’s 1934 trip to China, a country he 
had once dismissed as “old and tottering.” Would the Japanese government 
have helped pay for a trip to China of someone they suspected of being in 
the least opposed to Japan’s ever increasing encroachments on China, most 
especially the creation of a puppet state in Manchuria in 1932? 
This episode reveals that Suzuki, his socialist sympathies notwithstand-
ing, was quite willing to approach the pinnacle of power in Japan for per-
sonal advantage.  There is nothing particularly sinister in this, inasmuch 
as most if not all of us seek to “get ahead” in society, but it is nevertheless 
somewhat unseemly to see this “man of Zen” as he is known, this socialist 
sympathizer, seeking to ingratiate himself with aristocrats and an emperor, 
not least of all when compared with Huineng, the sixth Chan patriarch in 
China, who, it is claimed, staunchly refused to have anything to do with 
China’s emperor.
Further, when placed in the context of his times, Suzuki’s presentation of 
the history and values of Bushido in medieval Japan played directly into the 
hands of imperial military leaders who openly recognized, even celebrated, 
Zen’s historical influence on the formation of Bushido. These military 
leaders especially esteemed Zen for providing the spiritual foundation for 
Bushido’s “selfless” martial values that they regarded as a critical factor, 
if not the critical factor, in assuring victory over the “self-centered” and 
“materialistic” soldiers of Western nations who wanted nothing so much as 
to return home alive. By comparison, it was the Japanese soldiers’ willing-
ness, even eagerness, to die, these leaders believed, that made the Japanese 
military invincible in the aggregate.
To the extent that Suzuki’s writings promoted this willingness to die, they 
were a most welcome addition to the military’s morale-boosting efforts. 
Suzuki’s writings on Bushido were so highly valued that his article entitled 
“Zen and Bushido,” though first published in the intellectual journal Gen-
dai 現代 a few months earlier, was selected for inclusion in the military-
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dominated book, Bushidō no shinzui 武士道の神髄 (The Essence of Bushido), 
published less than one month prior to Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, i.e., 
on 10 November 1941. Other contributors to this volume included Impe-
rial Army General Araki Sadao 荒木貞夫 (1877–1966) and Imperial Navy 
Captain Hirose Yutaka 廣瀬豊 (n.d.–1960). Then Prime Minister Konoe 
Fumimaro 近衛文麿 (1891–1945) contributed the introductory essay.  
Suzuki’s article included such repeated statements as: “When it comes 
time to act, the best thing is simply to act. You can decide later on whether 
it was right or wrong. This is where the life of Zen lies. The life of Zen must 
become, just as it is, the life of the warrior.”66 And further, “The spirit of 
the warrior is truly to abandon this life, neither bragging of one’s achieve-
ments, nor complaining when one’s talents go unrecognized. It is simply a 
question of rushing forward toward one’s ideal.”67 
Satō maintains that references to abandoning life and death were not 
meant in any way to demonstrate Suzuki’s support for Japan’s full-scale war 
with China but, instead, parallel “the constant enjoinders heard in Zen train-
ing to resolve the central problem of samsara.”68 Even if this were true, the 
question must be asked how would Japanese readers, civilian or military, of 
a vehemently pro-war book like Bushidō no shinzui, have understood what 
Suzuki wrote?
This question is even more relevant because, contrary to Satō’s claims, 
later in the same article Suzuki clearly alluded to Japan’s war with China. 
Specifically, after discussing the successful defense of Japan mounted by 
Zen-trained Shōgun Hōjō Tokimune against thirteenth-century Mongol 
invaders, Suzuki wrote: “in reality the struggle against the Mongols didn’t 
last for only three or even five years but continued for more than ten years. 
There is, I believe, no comparison with what we are experiencing today [in 
the war with China] and the tense feelings of that time.”69 
By comparing Japan’s then four-year long, full-scale invasion of China 
with the more than decade-long resistance to the Mongols what was Suzuki’s 
intent? Was it not to encourage his Japanese readers to continue striving for 
victory, just as Hōjō had done, no matter how long it might take or whatever 
adversity they might encounter? And given that Japan’s thirteenth-century 
war with the Mongols was truly defensive in nature, was not Suzuki also 
making the claim, at least by analogy, that the war against China was defen-
66 Quoted in Suzuki 1941, p. 69. 
67 Quoted in Suzuki 1941, p. 75. 
68 Satō 2008, p. 93. 
69 Suzuki 1941, pp. 76–77.
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sive too? Far more importantly, it is noteworthy that Suzuki’s article con-
tained not so much as a single word acknowledging the immense suffering 
inflicted on the Chinese people by Japan’s ongoing aggression. 
Contrary to my own research, Satō claims that when Suzuki’s wartime 
writings are placed in their proper context they reveal that Suzuki never 
endorsed Japan’s militarism. Yet, by failing to address the crucial question 
of how Suzuki’s wartime readers would almost certainly have understood 
statements like the above, it is actually Satō who distorts the historical 
record, turning night into day. Furthermore, in a nation long engaged in 
full-scale warfare, it is inconceivable that Suzuki was unaware of how his 
writings on Zen and Bushido would be understood or used by the military. 
If by 1941 Suzuki were opposed to Japan’s war effort it must be said that 
he was eminently successful in hiding his opposition while, at the same 
time, garnering praise (and no doubt income) for his writings on Bushido, 
the imperial military’s most important morale-building tool. While Suzuki 
may not have played a major role in the war effort (and I have never sug-
gested otherwise), his writings, beginning with his very first book, nev-
ertheless played some role, especially when placed in the context of their 
overall effect on his readership. That said, the full extent of his role has yet 
to be determined.  
In Suzuki we find a man who appears, on the one hand, to have been 
tormented by his private if not secret opposition to Japan’s war effort 
sometime prior to, and still more following, Japan’s attack on the U.S. and 
Great Britain. Suzuki had, of course, lived in both countries and knew how 
strong, both militarily and industrially, these countries were (thereby recog-
nizing the likelihood of Japan’s defeat). Nevertheless, Suzuki was unwilling 
to sacrifice his career, let alone place himself and his family at risk, by pub-
licly opposing the war effort in his writings apart from some minor ambigu-
ous comments that could typically be taken in several ways.
At a purely human level, Suzuki’s fear of speaking out is quite under-
standable. In similar circumstances, how many of us would act differently? 
How many of us could, like Uchiyama Gudō, climb the scaffold steps 
radiating equanimity? Yet, Suzuki was no ordinary person, for he claimed 
initial enlightenment as his own, even while promoting the idea that Zen, 
when necessary, could supply an “iron will” to its practitioners so as to 
make them fearless in the face of death. Yet, when faced with the prospect 
of imprisonment or worse if he dared speak out, where were Suzuki’s own 
iron will, let alone his fearlessness, to be found? 
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Thus, based on the available evidence, the only reasonable conclusion 
is that in order to save himself and his family, if not advance his career, 
Suzuki, like so many wartime intellectuals in both Japan and Germany who 
inwardly “knew better,” collaborated, however reluctantly, with Japan’s 
militarists, including the imperial household, even while privately opposing 
the war effort, at least later on. And most importantly from the standpoint 
of this article, neither Suzuki’s public collaboration nor private opposi-
tion stemmed from his Zen practice. They were, in the end, the actions of 
a clever yet, in terms of ensuring his own survival, a very “ordinary” man. 
Nevertheless, Suzuki was a man who even after the war helped convince 
both Japanese and non-Japanese alike that the unity of Zen and the sword 
was genuinely Buddhist in nature. Herein lies the true tragedy of the man 
and his era.
Yet, if there is one thing to thank Suzuki for, it is exactly this. In the end, 
his idealized, sanitized and “bloodless” version of the murderous Bushido 
code, in which loyalty unto death trumps any other virtue, serves to reveal 
that the unity of Zen and the sword, together with the amoral and antino-
mian ethics on which it is based, cannot possibly be an authentic expression 
of the Buddha-dharma. Instead it represents nothing less than a betrayal, a 
betrayal made necessary by the Zen school’s need to accommodate itself to 
the needs of the “powers that be,” in the case of Japan, to the needs of its 
first patrons, the warrior class.
Similarly, we can now understand how readily Zen’s long-standing pro-
motion of a “value-neutral” meditation practice becomes, when needed, 
yet another enabling mechanism for violence. A mechanism that is the very 
antithesis of the genuinely compassionate teachings of Buddha Śākyamuni, 
based, as they are, on an experiential internalization, through meditation, of 
the identity of the self with all “other.” In alerting us, however unintention-
ally, of the need to reform a foundational aspect of the Zen school in Japan 
we owe Suzuki, and his loyal disciple Satō, a deep debt of gratitude. 
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